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This paper examines the earnings penalties and premiums associated with different
types of employment in 73 countries. Workers are divided into four categories:
non-professional own-account workers, employers and own-account professionals,
informal wage employees, and formal wage employees. Approximately half of the
workers in low income countries are non-professional own-account workers, and the
majority of the rest are informal employees. Fewer than 10 percent are formal
employees, and only 2 percent of workers in low income countries are employers or
own-account professionals. As per capita gross domestic product increases across
countries, there are large net shifts from non-professional own-account work into
formal wage employment. Across all regions and income levels, non-professional
own-account workers and informal wage employees face an earnings penalty
compared with formal wage employees. But in low income countries, this earnings
penalty is small, and non-professional own-account workers earn a positive premium
relative to all wage employees. Earnings penalties for non-professional own-account
workers tend to increase with gross domestic product and are largest for female
workers in high income countries. On average, employers and own-account
professionals earn a premium compared to employees, although there are important
differences across countries and between men and women. In terms of regional
differences, earnings premiums for employers and professionals are largest for men
in middle income Latin American countries. On the other hand, women employers
and professionals do not earn a statistically significant premium compared to
employees in any region of the world. These results are consistent with
compensating wage differentials and firm quasi-rents playing important roles in
explaining cross-country variation in earnings penalties, and raise questions about
the extent to which the unskilled self-employed are rationed out of formal wage
work in low income countries.
JEL Codes: J31, O171 Introduction
A defining characteristic of labor markets in developing countries is the high propor-
tion of workers who are self-employed or work in the informal sector. Despite a
sizeable literature, there remains little consensus on the extent to which self-employed
and informal sector workers are in those sectors because they are excluded from for-
mal sector employment or because they choose to be in those sectors based on pecuni-
ary or non-pecuniary factors. Earnings penalties for self- and informal employment areThe Author(s). 2016 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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studies have examined earnings differences between informal and formal employment,
and self- and wage employment, for individual countries or for some regions of the
world such as Latin America. However, comparative literature on how and why these
earnings gaps differ across countries around the world is sparse.
This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion on self-employment, informality,
labor market segmentation and earnings differentials. It uses multiple years of data
from the World Bank International Income Distribution Database (I2D2), a compre-
hensive set of harmonized household surveys, to estimate the proportion and wage dif-
ferentials of self-employed and wage employees from 73 countries around the world.
The first contribution is to provide new comprehensive estimates of the proportion of
workers who are non-professional own-account workers (interpreted broadly as a
measure of unskilled self-employment), employers and own-account professionals (a
measure of skilled self-employment), informal sector employees and formal sector em-
ployees. Our second major contribution is an estimate of the wage penalties or pre-
miums for each of these groups in countries around the world. The estimated
premiums/penalties for each country/year are from ordinary least squares estimates of
wage equations and control for worker characteristics such as age, education, gender,
as well as industry of work.
This study addresses the following questions: What proportion of workers fall into
the following categories: non-professional own-account workers, employers and own-
account professionals (which, for conciseness, we will also refer to as “employers and
professionals”), informal employees and formal employees? How does the proportion of
workers in each category change as per capita GDP increases? How does the propor-
tion of workers in each category differ across countries and regions? Do workers earn
an earnings premium or pay an earnings penalty for self-employment and informal em-
ployment? Is there a difference between the self-employed who are employers and
own-account professionals and those who are non-professional own-account workers?
How do the estimated self-employment and informal employee earnings penalties or
premiums change as per capita GDP increases? How do estimates of these premiums
or penalties vary across countries and regions? Finally, how do these penalties or pre-
miums differ between types of workers within countries?
We find that approximately half of the workers in low income countries are non-
professional own-account workers. Fewer than 10 percent are formal employees, and
only 2 percent of workers in low income countries are employers or professionals. As
per capita GDP increases, the proportion of workers who are formal employees, em-
ployers, and professional own-account workers increases, while the proportion of
workers who are non-professional own-account workers falls.
Across all regions and income levels, non-professional own-account workers and in-
formal sector workers face an earnings penalty compared to formal employees. How-
ever, both the non-professional own-account and informal earnings penalties are small
(and often insignificant) in low income countries. Furthermore, in a larger sample of 20
low income countries, self-employed workers earn a statistically significant wage pre-
mium compared to the average (informal and formal) wage employee. The earnings
penalties faced by non-professional own-account and informal employees tend to in-
crease as a country’s GDP increases. The earnings penalties for informal employees are
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own-account workers are largest in high income countries.
On average, across all countries in the sample, employers and own-account professional
workers earn a premium compared to employees, although there are important differ-
ences across countries and between men and women. Gender differences are particularly
strong when examining earnings premiums for employers and professionals. Overall, male
employers and professionals earn an 18 percent premium compared with all employees,
while women face a penalty of roughly the same magnitude. In terms of regional differ-
ences, earnings premiums for employers and professionals are largest for men in middle
income Latin American countries. On the other hand, women employers and profes-
sionals do not earn a statistically significant premium compared to employees in any
region of the world. In addition, neither male nor female employers and professionals earn
premiums in either high income or developing countries in Europe and Central Asia.
Conditions appear to be favorable for employers and professionals in Latin America, as
they are more numerous and earn greater premiums versus formal employees. In contrast,
conditions seem to be less favorable for the same group in Europe and Central Asia,
where they are fewer and do not earn premiums vs. formal employees.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the theoretical
literature on wage differentials and labor market segmentation as well as the latest em-
pirical findings across countries. Section III briefly describes the data, while section IV
describes the methodology used to estimate wage differentials for self-employed and in-
formal workers across various groups. In section V we present estimates of the propor-
tion of self-employed, informal, formal, and salaried workers from around the world. In
section VI, the main section of the paper, we examine the wage differentials for self-
employed, informal, formal, and salaried workers by country income level and regions
of the world. In particular, we empirically test the hypothesis that the informal and self-
employment sectors are heterogeneous by dividing self-employment into professional
and non-professional, by dividing employees into formal and informal, and by further
examining the wages of these group across education level, experience (measured by
age), gender, and whether there are urban/rural differences. Section VII concludes.2 Literature Review
2.1 Theoretical
In a standard neo-classical model in which labor markets are perfectly competitive,
labor is free to move between sectors and workers maximize earnings, identical
workers would earn the same amount whether they are self-employed, employees in
small firms, or employees in large firms. In a competitive labor market, this will be true
even though larger firms may offer facilities that boost worker productivity, such as ac-
cess to capital, export markets, and the opportunity to specialize. Assuming diminish-
ing marginal returns to labor in wage employment, the free movement of labor will
equalize earnings between wage employees in different firms and the self-employed.
What are departures from the competitive labor market model that could lead to an
observed earnings penalty or premium for self-employed workers vs. employees, or for
employees in different types of firms? Most explanations of persistent earnings differen-
tials between the self-employed and employees are based on barriers to movement in
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labor markets in developing economies is that they are segmented or dualistic, where
formal sector jobs are restricted by minimum wage, tax laws, and labor market regula-
tions that limit employment in the formal sector. Key to this view is that either govern-
ment regulations, especially those on labor market, or efficiency wages limit the
availability of formal sector employment and make it difficult for non-formal sector
workers to compete for formal sector jobs. That is, some workers are “excluded” from
the formal sector by labor market regulations or efficiency wages. This view argues that
workers unable to find adequate employment opportunities in the formal sector are
forced to take employment as self-employed workers or employees in the low paid,
marginal informal sector firms. In this view, both self-employed workers and informal
employees are “excluded” from the formal sector. Limiting competition from these “ex-
cluded” workers keeps the wages of formal sector workers above the market-clearing
wage, resulting in wage penalties for the excluded workers. The dualistic labor market
view subscribes to the notion that informality stems from an imbalance between high
population growth and the slow growth of “good” formal jobs (Harris and Todaro
1970; Fields 2005, 2009; Tokman 1978; De Mel et al. 2010).
One distinguishing feature of labor market segmentation is earnings differentials; earn-
ings gaps between informal sector workers (both self-employed and employees) and
equally-qualified formal wage and salaried employees has often been interpreted as a
measure of the degree of labor market segmentation (Lewis 1954; Mincer 1962; Fields
2009). In this view, self-employment and informal wage employment are prevalent in low
income economies because the formal economy is incapable of providing enough good,
high-wage jobs. As countries develop, the proportion of workers who are self-employed
and informal employees should fall, and the wage differential between the self-employed
and informal employees vs. formal employees should eventually disappear.
An alternative explanation for why there might be a self-employment or informal em-
ployee earnings penalty that does not rely on segmented labor markets is that workers
maximize utility rather than earnings, leading to systematic compensating wage differen-
tials. For example, if self-employment is more desirable than wage employment for rea-
sons unrelated to earnings, such as greater autonomy and flexibility, we would expect to
see a self-employment earnings penalty. Unlike the labor market segmentation explan-
ation for self-employment and informal sector earnings penalties, the compensating dif-
ferential explanation suggests that the earnings penalty will be particularly large in more
developed countries and among better educated workers, where the opportunity cost of
time is higher and therefore the flexibility of self-employment will be valued more.
A third possibility is that the standard neo-classical labor market model is correct, but
that empirically the compensation of self-employed workers, informal employees, or for-
mal employees is not measured properly. Absolute estimates of wage gaps are inherently
imprecise due to the difficulty of measuring self-reported profits and of valuing non-wage
benefits. For example, self-employed workers might systematically under-report earnings,
which could lead to an observed self-employed penalty even when none exists (Hurst
et al. 2010). On the other hand, the self-reported earnings of employees include only
returns to labor, while the self-reported earnings of the self-employed may also include
returns to capital, as well as returns to the risk of entrepreneurship. Failing to account for
this may overestimate the self-employment earnings premium. Furthermore, formal
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wage benefits such as firms’ contributions to pensions, sick pay, severance pay, and health
care, while self-employed workers and informal sector workers, who do not receive these
non-wage benefits, may receive higher paid wages as compensating differentials. In the
competitive labor market described above, self-employed and informal sector employees
would include compensation for these foregone non-wage benefits (Meghir et al. 2015),
which would lead to overestimation of self-employment and informal sector earnings
(and may even lead to a measured premium for self-employment and informality).
When examining earnings premiums, it is useful to distinguish between low-skilled
self-employment, entrepreneurial self-employment, and informal wage employment.
While many have identified self-employment in developing countries with the informal
sector, others identify self-employment with entrepreneurship (Bennett and Estrin
2010; de Soto 1989). Higher skilled, more entrepreneurial self-employed may earn a
wage premium compared to formal employment. This could arise if the most motivated
and productive workers became entrepreneurs, or if there are compensating earnings
differentials for entrepreneurs that compensate for increased risk and volatility, or if
wage employees’ compensation is underestimated in the data.
High adjustment or entry costs into entrepreneurship could also contribute to an ob-
served self-employment premium because the future earnings of entrepreneurs would
need to compensate for these costs. One such adjustment cost is the initial investment
needed to set up a small business, often financed through credit. If credit markets are
imperfect and it is difficult to obtain credit, then self-employed entrepreneurs must be
paid more than they could get as employees in order to compensate them for the high
costs of credit. On the other hand, in low income countries many self-employment op-
portunities may require little capital, while searching for higher-paid wage employment
may involve relocating or other expensive search costs.1 For those facing credit con-
straints, starting a low-level business as a petty trader or farmer may entail less upfront
cost than searching for a wage job. In this case, imperfect credit markets would create
a self-employment earnings penalty.
Another adjustment cost of self-employment and entrepreneurship could be associ-
ated with complying with regulations and permits needed to start a business. These
costs can be substantial in many developing countries (de Soto 1989). If there are regu-
latory and other costs to becoming self-employed that limit access, then self-employed
workers will be paid more to compensate for these additional costs, causing an ob-
served self-employment wage premium. For example, if it is costly and time consuming
to obtain all of the necessary permits and permissions to work as self-employed (i.e., a
more regulated economy), or if taxes are higher for the self-employed than for em-
ployees, then self-employed workers may be paid more than they could get as em-
ployees as compensation for the high costs of entry. Note that the self-employed would
need to be compensated for these regulatory costs even if they attempt to avoid them
because there may be costs to violating these regulations.
A final possible reason why formal sector wage employees may earn more than simi-
lar self-employed workers is that formal sector employees may successfully bargain for
a portion of the quasi-rents earned by firms. Several studies have identified non-
competitive rents as an important determinant of inter-industry wage differentials.2
Most recently, Abowd et al. (2012) find that shared quasi-rents account for a large
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bargaining models that allow for on the job search (i.e. Cahuc et al. (2006)), they posit that
the wage formal sector firms pay employees is the sum of the opportunity cost of wage em-
ployment plus the workers’ share of quasi-rents. Under the assumption that earnings in self-
employment or the informal sector is an approximation of comparable formal sector wage
workers’ opportunity cost, the self-employment and informal employment earnings penalties
will be determined by the bargaining power of workers and the size of the quasi-rents. That
is, the self-employment and informal sector earnings penalty will increase if the relative bar-
gaining power of formal sector employees increases or if firms’ quasi-rents increase.
The bargaining power of formal sector employees, and therefore self-employment
and informal sector wage penalties, could be increased by the presence of efficiency
wages or labor market institutions such as unions. Van Reenen (1996) focuses on the
role of innovation and increased labor productivity in generating quasi-rents, which
firms can then “share” with workers as efficiency wages. That study presents strong evi-
dence that workers in British firms that adopt more innovative and productive tech-
nologies earn more than identical workers in other firms. It argues that more
productive firms allocate part of their “quasi-rents” from innovation to workers in the
form of higher wages. To the extent formal sector firms share quasi-rents with workers,
this would contribute to a self-employment and informal sector wage penalty. These
penalties would be larger in countries where firms are more productive, and therefore
have more quasi-rents to share, and/or in countries in which labor market institutions
favor workers in the wage bargaining process.
In one traditional dualistic model of economic development, the formal sector in least
developed countries is small (and self-employment and informal employment are large)
because lack of demand, credit, reliable inputs, and export markets keep scale and prod-
uctivity low for formal sector products (see Lewis 1954 and La Porta and Schleifer 2014).
For this reason, formal sector firms in low income countries will be less productive. Since
firms in low income countries tend to be less productive than those in more developed
countries, quasi-rents and by extension self-employment penalties would likely be smaller
for workers in low income countries. As demand increases for domestic products and
credit, input and export markets expand, the scale of production and productivity increase
in the formal sector. As countries develop, firms not only earn more quasi-rents, but labor
market institutions may also become more effective in increasing workers’ bargaining
power. Both of these factors will lead to increased earnings for formal sector employees
relative to the self-employed and informal sector workers.2.2 Empirical
This paper contributes to the literature on the estimation of the magnitudes of earnings
differentials between self-employed and informal sector employees relative to formal
sector employees in developing economies. Many of these studies are based on data
from Latin America and the Caribbean and most focus on middle income countries.
Almost universally, these studies find that workers in the informal sector earn less than
equally qualified employees in the formal sector (i.e. Heckman and Hotz 1986; Gindling
1991; Basch and Paredes-Molina 1996; Launov 2006; and Günther and Launov 2012).
However, not all informal sector workers are self-employed, and the self-employed may
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Latin America, Perry et al. (2007, p.6) conclude that the self-employed voluntarily opt
out of the formal sector, while informal salaried workers are queuing for more desirable
jobs in either the formal salaried sector or as self-employed workers.
When researchers estimate formal-informal wage differentials separately for informal sec-
tor employees and self-employed workers, they typically find different results for the two
groups. Compared to formal sector wage and salary employees, Arias and Khamis (2009)
find an earnings penalty for informal wage and salary employees but an earnings premium
for self-employed workers in Argentina. Nguyen et al. (2013) find the same result in
Vietnam. Using quantile regressions, Nguyen et al. (2013) further find that both informal
employees and the self-employed are likely to face an earnings penalty at the bottom of the
earnings distribution and an earnings premium at the top. In Peru, Saavedra and Chong
(1999) find an earnings penalty for informal sector employees, but no difference between
the wages of informal self-employed workers and formal sector employees. Maloney (1999)
finds that workers who transition from wage and salary employment into self-employment
in Mexico benefit from higher earnings, while workers who transition into informal sector
wage and salary employment experience a decline in earnings.
The studies reviewed thus far are from developing economies. Asteibro and Chen
(2014) review estimates from OECD and other developed economies. They conclude that
“these studies confirm that the estimated average returns to self-employment are negative,
or at least not positive” in high income countries (p. 89). Asteibro and Chen (2014) show
that, at least for the United States, the self-employment penalty may exist because entre-
preneurs systematically underrepresent their earnings. Most studies indicate that the
distribution of earnings among the self-employed (entrepreneurs) is more skewed than
that of employees, with a somewhat thicker and longer tail at the upper end of earnings.
This suggests that there may be a self-employment wage penalty at the bottom of the
distribution but a premium at the top. Sorgner et al. (2014) show that this is true in
Germany. This study further distinguishes the self-employed in Germany between those
who have employees and those without employees, and find that, on average, there is a
wage premium for those with employees and a wage penalty for those without.
We know of very few studies that use comparable data and techniques to compare
informal or self-employment earnings differentials across a large set of countries from
different regions of the world and for a wide range of income groups. Gasparini and
Tornarolli (2007) present estimates for 19 Latin American countries and conclude that
formal salaried workers earn substantially more than informal salaried workers but that
there are no statistically significant differences in wages between self-employed and sal-
aried workers. The only study that we know of to compare estimates from countries in
different regions of the world is Bargain and Kwenda (2011), who compare estimates
from two Latin American countries (Brazil and Mexico) and South Africa. They find an
average wage penalty for informal employees in all three countries. However, using
quantile regressions (and controlling for individual fixed effects), they show that the in-
formal sector wage penalty is larger in the lower part of the conditional distribution
and tends to disappear at the top. For self-employed workers, the premiums differ by
country. In Mexico, there is a wage premium for self-employment, especially at the top
of the distribution; in Brazil, there is no significant difference in earnings between the
self-employed and employees; while in South Africa, both informal sector and self-
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formal sector employees.
In summary, while the literature on wage differentials points to consistent earnings pen-
alties for wage and salary employment in the informal sector relative to the formal sector,
this is not the case for self-employment relative to wage and salaried employment in ei-
ther sector. Most published studies conclude that self-employed workers do not earn less
than equally qualified formal sector wage and salaried employees. However, most of these
studies are from middle income and/or Latin American countries; there are few studies of
self-employment earnings differentials in low income countries outside of Latin America.
Our paper contributes to the literature on informal and self-employment wage penalties
or premiums by estimating and comparing these earnings differentials for a wider range
of developing and high income countries than currently exists in the literature.
3 Data
The data source for this paper is the International Income Distribution Database
(I2D2),3 a database of micro-level household surveys harmonized by the Development
Economics Research Group of the World Bank, This database consists of nationally
representative labor force surveys, budget surveys, or living standards measurement
surveys. In many cases, the surveys provide information on the earnings and other rele-
vant socioeconomic characteristics of self-employed and wage and salary employees.
The data include three sets of consistently defined and coded variables: (i) demo-
graphic, (ii) education, and (iii) labor force variables.
Not all variables are available in all countries and years. We limit our analysis to sur-
veys where we can identify whether the worker is self-employed or a wage and salary
employee, and where data is collected on the earnings of both the self-employed and
wage and salaried workers.4 In most countries, data are available for multiple years.
Our full sample consists of 347 surveys (country/year combinations), representing 73
countries, from 1980 to 2013. We limit our analysis to the working age population, 15-
65 years old. The full country–year combinations available for our analysis, as well as
the estimated earnings premiums(+)/penalties(-) for each country/year observation, are
listed in the Additional file 1.
We begin by examining the earnings differentials between self-employed workers and all
wage and salaried employees. We are able to examine earnings differentials using 347
household surveys from 73 countries. Two thirds of these surveys (62 percent) are from
Latin America, while 90 percent are from either Latin America or Europe and Central Asia.
We recognize that within the self-employed there may be large differences between
employers and professional own-account workers (i.e. lawyers, doctors, accountants,
etc.) and non-professional own-account workers (unskilled self-employed). Therefore,
where possible, we separate self-employed workers into two categories: (i) non-
professional own-account workers and (ii) employers and own-account professionals.
We are able to examine earnings differentials between these two types of self-employed
workers vs. employees in 152 surveys and 42 countries. Over 50 percent of these sur-
veys are from Europe and Central Asia (33 percent from high income ECA countries,
18 percent from developing ECA countries) and 34 percent are from Latin America.
There may also be substantial differences between formal and informal employees,
especially in developing countries. We identify formal employees as those who exhibit
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or an employer who pays towards social security or health insurance. Employees who are
not identified as formal are classified as informal. We are able to examine differences be-
tween formal and informal employees and between self-employed workers vs. informal or
formal employees in 190 surveys from 34 countries. Most (90 percent) of the surveys
where we can identify formal from informal employees are from by Latin America.
4 Methodology: Estimating the Self-Employment Earnings Penalty/Premium
We estimate the earnings premiums/penalties in each survey using individual worker-level
(i) data to estimate the following earnings equation for each country(c)/year(t) combination:
LnY ict ¼ αþ EPct  SEict þ βctXict þ μict ð1Þ
Where
 Yict is the dependent variable, self-reported monthly earnings of worker i in country
c in year t.
 Xict is a set of variables that partially control for observed differences between
workers and industries. These are: years of education, years of education squared,
age, age squared, a gender dummy variable, an urban/rural dummy variable, a set of
dummy variables for one-digit industry code, and a set of dummy variables repre-
senting the frequency of wage payments.5
 μict is the error term
 SEict is a dummy variable indicating whether the worker is self-employed (1) or a
wage and salary worker (0)
 EPct is the average self-employment earnings premium, estimated separately for
each survey (country(c)/year(t) combination). Specifically, EPct is the percent by
which the earnings of the self-employed differ from the earnings of wage and salary
workers. If EPct is positive, that indicates that there is an earnings premium for self-
employment; a negative EPct indicates an earnings penalty.
The first set of earnings differential estimates that we present use this specification to
estimate the earnings premium/penalty between self-employed workers and all employees.
In a second set of estimates we re-estimate equation 1 and include two self-employment
dummy variables to identify non-professional own-account workers and employers and
own-account professionals (the reference category is all employees). From this regression
we obtain estimates of the earnings differentials between non-professional own-account
workers vs. employees, employers and professionals vs. employees, and non-professional
own-account workers vs. employers and professionals. In a third set of estimates we sep-
arate formal and informal sector employees and estimate the earnings differentials be-
tween them, as well as between all self-employed workers vs. informal employees, and all
self-employed workers vs. formal employees. Finally, we re-estimate equation 1 and inter-
act the two self-employed and formal/informal dummy variables to obtain estimates of
the earnings differentials between non-professional own-account workers vs. formal sec-
tor workers, non-professional own-account workers vs. informal employees, and em-
ployers and professionals vs. non-professional own-account workers.
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our sample by income level and regions. In calculating these means across surveys
we weight the estimates in three ways. First, in calculating means across countries;
the estimates of the earnings differentials in each country are weighted by total
employment for that country and year in order to take into account the differences
in the employment level for each country. In addition, because the number of sur-
veys in the data for each country are different, the results from each survey (coun-
try/year combination) are also weighted by the inverse of the number of surveys
for each country. Weighted this way, each country is effectively counted once even
if there are more than one survey for that country. Finally, because the estimates
of earnings differentials in each country are based on varying sample sizes and thus
have different standard errors, we also weight the results from each survey by the
inverse of the estimated standard error of the average self-employment earnings
premium, which we estimate separately for each survey (i.e. country/year combin-
ation- EPct). This accounts for heteroscedasticity when aggregating estimated self-
employment premiums across surveys.
5 The Extent of Self-Employment and Informal Employment Around the
World
Table 1 presents the mean proportion of workers in each employment category
across all surveys in the sample and for countries at different income levels. Specif-
ically, Table 1 presents the proportion of workers who are: self-employed (divided
between non-professional own-account vs. employers and own-account profes-
sionals) and employees (divided between informal employees and formal em-
ployees). Approximately 50 percent of workers in low income countries are non-
professional own-account workers (Table 1b). As per capita income increases, the
proportion of non-professional own-account workers falls to 20 percent in upper
middle income countries and 7 percent in high income countries. At the same
time, as per capita income increases from low to upper-middle income countries
the proportion of employers and professionals increases from 2 percent in low in-
come countries to over 4.5 percent in upper middle income and high income
countries.
Fewer than half of workers in low income countries are wage and salaried em-
ployees (see Table 1a). This proportion increases as the per capita income of a
country grows, and almost 90 percent of workers in high income countries are
wage and salaried employees. In addition, the proportion of employees in the for-
mal sector increases, from less than 10 percent of workers in low income countries
to almost half of all workers in upper middle income countries (Table 1c). We do
not have direct estimates of informal and formal sector employees for high income
countries, but we expect that most wage employees are formal in high income
OECD countries.6
Table 2 presents the proportion of workers in each category by region of the world.
For most regions, the proportion of workers in each category follows the existing pat-
terns by income group. For example, in regions characterized by low and lower-middle
income countries (East Asia and the Pacific, Middle East and North Africa (MENA),
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Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 14 of 39relatively small and the proportion of non-professional own-account worker is relatively
large (Table 2b and c). At the other end of the income scale, in high income countries
of Europe and North America, the proportion of formal sector employees is relatively
large and the proportion of non-professional own-account worker is relatively small. In
Latin America, composed mostly of middle income countries, the proportion of
workers in each category is between those of the low income and high income
countries.
Middle income countries in Europe and Central Asia combine elements of high in-
come European and Central Asian economies with those of middle income Latin
American countries. For example, the proportion of self-employed workers in develop-
ing European and Central Asian countries is very low, 5 percent, compared to 11 per-
cent in high income Europe and Central Asia and 32 percent in middle income Latin
America. On the other hand, the proportion of informal employees in developing Euro-
pean and Central Asian countries is similar to the 23 percent in Latin America. Within
the developing European and Central Asian economies we can identify informal vs. for-
mal employees only for the Balkan and Central Asian economies. In these Balkan and
Central Asia economies the proportion of informal employees in the developing econ-
omies of Europe and Central Asia is high at 45 percent. While using the surveys that
we have available we cannot identify informal vs. formal employment in the transition
economies of Eastern Europe, other studies of informal employment in the transition
economies report levels of less than 45 percent. For example, Lehmann (2015) esti-
mates the size of informal employment in Russia at between 6 percent and 19 percent
of workers (depending on the definition of “informal”).6 Earnings Penalties and Premiums for Self-Employment and Informal Em-
ployees around the World
In Table 3 we report the results of the estimation of wage penalties (-) and premiums
(+) for all self-employed workers vs. all employees, non-professional own-account
workers vs. formal and informal employees, employers and professionals vs. formal and
informal employees, and informal vs. formal employees.
On average across countries a clear ordering emerges; after controlling for education,
age, gender, region of residence and industry sector, employers and own-account pro-
fessionals earn the most. In particular, employers and professionals earn more than for-
mal and informal employees, and more than self-employed non-professional own-
account workers. After employers and professionals come formal sector employees,
who earn more than non-professional own-account workers and informal employees.
Finally, non-professional own-account workers earn more than the lowest-paid cat-
egory, informal employees.6.1 By Level of Development (GDP per Capita)
Table 3 also presents earnings differentials separately for countries by income level.
The estimates show substantial differences between low, middle and high income coun-
tries. Informal employees face an earnings penalty compared to formal employees in
each income group. The informal earnings penalty is small and not significantly differ-
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Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 17 of 39increases with GDP per capita, from less than 2 percent in low income countries to
over 30 percent in lower-middle and upper-middle income countries (Table 3c).
Non-professional own-account workers in low income countries earn, on average, a
premium relative to all employees, while non-professional own-account workers in high
income countries pay a penalty (Table 3b). Broadly, the earnings of non-professional
own-account workers relative to employees fall as the income per capita of a country
increases. Figure 1b, which present the distribution of non-professional own-accounta
b
c
Fig. 1 a Earnings differentials vs. log GDP per capita – Self-employment vs. employees. b Earnings differen-
tials vs. log GDP per capita – Non-professional own-account vs. employees. c Earnings differentials vs. log
GDP per capita – Employers and professionals vs. employees
Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 18 of 39earnings penalties and premiums by a country’s income level, further illustrate this pat-
tern. Many low income countries exhibit an earnings premium for non-professional
own-account workers, for middle income countries the earnings differentials between
non-professional own-account workers and employees cluster around zero (although
most are negative (i.e. penalties)), while almost all high income countries exhibit earn-
ings penalties. This pattern of increasing earnings penalties for self-employed workers
persist whether we examine earnings differentials between the self-employed vs. em-
ployees (Fig. 1a) or non-professional own-account vs. employees (Fig. 1b). Moreover,
the same pattern appears for all considered demographic sub-groups: urban, rural,
male, female, by age group and education levels (Figs. 2, 3 and 4 and Tables 5, 6, 7, 8
and 9). Comparing non-professional own-account workers with formal employees is in-
formative but comes at a major cost, as the sample is reduced from 42 to 15 countries.
In that small sample, the estimated penalty faced by non-professional own-account
workers relative to formal employees is similar across country income groups. Specific-
ally, the estimated penalty is 16 percent (and statistically insignificant) in low income
countries, and 23 and 12 percent in lower- and upper-middle income countries, re-
spectively (See Table 3d).
Employers and professionals earn a statistically significant premium of over 50 per-
cent in low and upper middle income countries (Table 3b). This premium falls to 8 per-
cent and becomes statistically insignificant in high income countries. Figure 1c presents
earnings differentials between employers and professionals vs. employees for the each
country in our sample. Employers and professionals earn a premium in most low and
middle income countries compared to employees. In many high income countries em-
ployers and professionals face a penalty compared to employees, and in countries
where they earn a premium compared to employees the premium tends to be small.6.2 By Region of the World
In Table 4 we report the results of the estimates of penalties (-) and premiums (+) by
region of the world. As we have noted earlier, over 90 percent of our sample of surveys
comes from either Latin America or Europe and Central Asia. Outside of Latin Amer-
ica and Europe and Central Asia, the largest group of surveys in our sample comes
from Sub-Saharan Africa. We therefore focus on these regions in our regional analysis.
We find some similarities between regions, but also some interesting differences, which
suggest that care should be taken when generalizing the results from studies in Latin
America to other regions of the world.
In all regions for which we have data (Latin America, developing Europe and East
Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa), non-professional own-account workers pay an earnings
penalty relative to formal employees. Similarly, informal employees earn significantly
less than formal employees in Latin America (but not in the developing middle income
European and Central Asian economies). On the other hand, while employers and pro-
fessionals earn statistically significant premiums compared to employees in Latin
America and Sub-Saharan Africa, this is not true in Europe and Central Asia. In both
high income and developing European and Central Asian economies there is no statis-
tically significant difference in the earnings of employers and professionals compared to
employees. Taken together, these results suggest that informal employees are
ab
c
Fig. 2 a Earnings differentials vs. log GDP per capita – Urban self-employment vs. employees. b Earnings
differentials vs. log GDP per capita – Urban Non-professional own-account vs. employees. c Earnings differ-
entials vs. log GDP per capita – Urban Employers and professionals vs. employees
Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 19 of 39particularly disadvantaged in Latin America (but not in the developing economies of
Europe and Central Asia), while employers and professional own-account workers do
much better in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa than in Europe and Central Asia.
As Latin American and the developing countries of Europe and Central Asia have simi-




Fig. 3 a Earnings differentials vs. log GDP per capita – Female self-employment vs. employees. b Earnings
differentials vs. log GDP per capita – Female Non-professional own-account vs. employees. c Earnings differ-
entials vs. log GDP per capita – Female Employers and professionals vs. employees
Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 20 of 396.3 For Urban Workers Only
Many analyses of self-employment and labor market segmentation focus on urban and
non-agricultural labor markets. Therefore, it is useful to examine the results for only
urban workers and see if they are consistent with results found using data for all




Fig. 4 a Earnings differentials vs. log GDP per capita – Male self-employment vs. employees. b Earnings dif-
ferentials vs. log GDP per capita – Male Non-professional own-account vs. employees. c Earnings differen-
tials vs. log GDP per capita – Male Employers and professionals vs. employees
Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 21 of 39There are no noticeable differences between Table 3 (urban plus rural) and Table 5
(urban only). The results for urban workers are similar to the results for all workers to-
gether. A clear ordering emerges across countries of all income levels. After controlling
for education, age, gender, region of residence and industry sector, employers and pro-
fessional own-account workers earn the most. Employers and professionals earn more
than formal and informal employees, and more than non-professional own-account
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Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 26 of 39more than non-professional own-account workers and informal employees. Finally,
non-professional own-account workers earn more than the lowest-paid category, infor-
mal employees.
In low income countries penalties for non-professional own-account workers vs. for-
mal employees and for informal vs. formal employees are small. In middle income
countries penalties for non-professional own-account workers vs. formal employees
and for informal vs. formal employees are larger than in low income countries and are
statistically different from zero. Penalties for non-professional own-account workers are
largest and highly statistically significant in high income countries. Panels a and b in
Fig. 2 further illustrate this pattern, presenting the distribution of self-employment
earnings penalties and premiums by country income level. Most (but not all) low in-
come countries exhibit a non-professional own-account earnings premium, middle in-
come countries’ earnings differentials cluster around zero (although most are
penalties), and almost all high income countries exhibit penalties for non-professional
own-account workers.
Figure 2c presents earnings differentials between employers and professionals vs. em-
ployees. In most low and middle income countries employers and professionals earn a
premium compared to employees, while in most high income countries employers and
professionals pay a penalty compared to employees.6.4 For Men and Women
In most countries represented in the sample, women are primarily responsible for
unpaid family responsibilities such as childcare, housework and elder care. This
suggests that women may value the flexibility of self-employment more than men,
and therefore may be willing to accept lower earnings to compensate for the
greater flexibility in hours and location of work (a “motherhood wage gap”). It is
possible that women’s work tends to be undervalued and, in return, the wage
structure within such countries might reflect that sentiment. It is possible, there-
fore, that self-employment and informal earnings penalties/premiums may differ
between men and women. To examine this possibility, we re-estimate the entire
set of earnings differentials separately for men and women. Tables 6 and 7 present
the results.
The results show that both non-professional own-account men and women workers
face earnings penalties compared to formal employees, but the penalties women face
tend to be larger than those faced by men. The additional penalty faced by female non-
professional own-account workers increases as the per-capita income of a country in-
creases (Table 6). For example, the differences between men and women in the earn-
ings penalty for non-professional own-account vs. formal employees are not
significantly different from zero for low income countries, but are large and statistically
significant in middle income countries. From middle income to high income countries,
the gap between men and women increases further. Male-female differences in the
earnings penalties between non-professional own-account workers compared to em-
ployees are largest in high income countries.
Differences between male and female employers and own-account professionals are
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Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 31 of 39professionals earn a premium compared to employees, while women pay a penalty.
These results suggest that women may be more willing than men to accept a negative
compensating earnings differential for self-employment, and that this phenomenon is
more pronounced in high income countries.
On the other hand, the earnings penalties paid for informal employment (vs. formal
employment) are similar for men and women. This suggests that the differences be-
tween men and women in self-employment penalties/premiums may be because of
compensating differentials for the flexibility of self-employment, while no similar flexi-
bility exists for informal sector employees.
Table 7 presents earnings penalties/premiums, separately for men and women, for
different regions of the world. In all regions women pay a higher penalty than men for
non-professional own-account compared to formal employment. On the other hand, in
all regions the earnings penalties for informal employment vs. formal employment are
similar for men and women.
The most noticeable regional difference is in the earnings differences between em-
ployers and professionals vs. employees. In Latin America men earn a premium as em-
ployers and professionals but women do not, while in Europe and Central Asia neither
men nor women earn a significant premium or penalty as employers and professionals.
Figures 3 and 4 present the distribution of earnings premiums/penalties for men and
women by countries’ GDP per capita. Patterns for each gender are similar to the overall
patterns. Earnings penalties for both non-professional own-account workers and infor-
mal employees are small in low income countries and increase with GDP per capita.6.5 By Education Level
Table 8 presents self-employment and informal/formal earnings penalties/premiums for
workers at four education levels: primary incomplete, primary graduate, secondary
graduate/university incomplete and university graduate.9 In general, there are statisti-
cally significant self-employment earnings premiums for less educated workers in low
income countries, but statistically significant earnings penalties for this group in middle
and high income countries. Self-employment earnings premiums/penalties are not sig-
nificantly different from zero for the most part for self-employed secondary and univer-
sity graduates.
At all education levels, informal employees face earnings penalties compared to for-
mal employees. Also at all levels of education, earnings penalties faced by informal em-
ployees increase as a countries’ GDP per capita increases. Across all education levels,
informal earnings penalties are small and often insignificant in low income countries
and increase and become statistically significant in middle income countries.6.6 By Age
Previous research suggests that successful self-employed workers tend to be older, mid-
career workers. This suggests that we might find earnings premiums for the older self-
employed but earnings penalties for the younger self-employed. To examine this issue,
Table 9 presents earnings differentials for self-employed vs. employees, non-
professional own-account vs. employees and employers and professionals vs. employees
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Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 34 of 39professional own-account workers nor earnings premiums for employers and profes-
sionals show any clear pattern between age groups; for some income groups they are
bigger for older workers and for other income groups they are smaller for older
workers compared to younger workers.
For all age levels, informal employees face earnings penalties compared to formal em-
ployees. Also at all age levels, earnings penalties faced by informal employees increase
as a countries’ GDP per capita increases. Informal earnings penalties are small and
often insignificant in low income countries and increase and become statistically sig-
nificant in middle income countries.6.7 Discussion and Interpretation of Results
Whether self-employed workers pay a penalty or earn a premium depends on a variety
of factors, including their country’s level of development, where it is located, the
worker’s gender, and whether those self-employed workers are employers (entrepre-
neurs) and skilled own-account professionals or are (presumably unskilled) non-
professional own-account workers. On this last point, employers and own-account pro-
fessionals tend to earn greater premiums, which is consistent with the hypothesis that
their earnings reflect not only their greater productivity, but also returns to capital and
risk. In other words, employers and professionals are likely to receive positive earnings
compensating differential to make up for the additional costs or risks involved in start-
ing their own business.
Male employers and professional own-account workers in many developing countries
enjoy a particularly large earnings premium compared to formal employees, while fe-
male employers and professionals do not. In fact, our estimates suggest that female em-
ployers and professionals in low and high income countries pay a statistically
significant penalty compared to employees, while in middle income countries estimated
penalties are statistically insignificant. These gender differences are consistent with the
hypothesis that women are more willing to accept lower wages as compensating earn-
ings differentials for the flexibility of self-employment.
The premiums earned by employers and own-account professionals also vary by re-
gion. These workers earn large and statistically significant premiums compared to em-
ployees in Latin America. But in high income and developing economies in Europe and
Central Asia, there is no significant difference in the earnings of employers and profes-
sionals compared to formal employees. This suggests either that employers and profes-
sionals face disadvantages in Europe and Central Asia that they do not face in Latin
America or Sub-Saharan Africa, or that Latin American employers require greater
profits to enter or maintain their business than those in Europe.
Evidence on labor market segmentation is mixed, and much stronger for middle in-
come countries than for low income countries. In developing countries, non-
professional self-employed workers face earnings penalties compared to formal em-
ployees. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of labor market segmentation in
developing countries. However, we also find evidence that as the per capita GDP of a
country increases the earnings of the self-employed fall relative to the earnings of for-
mal employees. This is true for both non-professional own-account workers and em-
ployers and professional own-account workers. This finding is not consistent with the
Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 35 of 39hypothesis that labor market segmentation is causing penalties for self-employment. In-
stead, it is more consistent with the hypothesis that earnings differentials are due to
compensating differentials where self-employed workers are willing to pay an earnings
penalty in exchange for the flexibility of self-employment.
Evidence on segmentation for informal wage employees follows a similar pattern. In-
formal employees in developing countries tend to face earnings penalties relative to for-
mal employees, which is consistent with labor market segmentation between the formal
and informal employment in developing countries caused by the exclusion of informal
employees from the formal sector. However, earnings penalties faced by informal em-
ployees are low and insignificant in low income countries and large and statistically sig-
nificant in middle income countries. This suggests that labor market segmentation
between formal and informal employment is more prominent in middle income coun-
tries than in low income countries.
Examined differently, the increase in the self-employment and informal earnings pen-
alty as GDP increases indicates that as countries develop formal employees’ earnings
increase faster than those of the self-employed or informal sector employees. This sug-
gests that the focus should be on what happens to formal employees rather than self-
employed and informal employees. This is true in one traditional dualistic model of
economic development where the formal sector in the least developed countries is
small (and self-employment and informal employment are large) because of lack of de-
mand for formal sector products is insufficient to allow for the necessary economies of
scale (see Lewis 1954 and La Porta and Schleifer 2014). For this reason, formal sector
firms in low income countries will be less productive. As demand increases for domes-
tic products, the scale of production and productivity increase in the formal sector.
This will lead to an increase in the proportion of workers in formal employment as well
as an increase in earnings for formal sector employees, which in turn will lead to larger
penalties for informal employees and non-professional self-employed.
Our evidence is thus consistent with the view that earnings gaps between the self-
employed, informal employees and formal employees are due to efficiency wages and
the sharing of quasi-rents in formal sector firms. Because it is likely that formal sector
firms in low income countries are less productive than those in more developed coun-
tries, and offer fewer resources that boost worker productivity, these firms earn fewer
rents that can be shared with workers. As countries develop and firms gain access to
innovative technologies, the productivity of employees in firms increases, allowing
firms to share more of their quasi-rents with workers. This increases the wages of for-
mal employees relative to the self-employed and informal employees. It is also reason-
able to expect that the bargaining power of formal employees will also increase as
countries develop, due to the increasing prevalence of unions and the better enforce-
ment of labor regulations. If the bargaining power of workers is positively correlated
with level of development and labor productivity, then the correlation between the em-
ployee’s share of quasi-rents and development and productivity will be even stronger.
7 Conclusion
We find that approximately half of all workers in low income countries are non-
professional own-account workers, while only 9 percent are formal employees, and only
2 percent of workers in low income countries are employers or professionals. As
Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 36 of 39countries develop, the proportion of workers who are formal employees, employers and
professional own-account workers increases, while the proportion of workers who are
non-professional own-account workers falls. In high income countries, non-
professional own-account workers make up 7 percent of all workers, employers and
professionals make up less than 5 percent are, and almost 90 percent are employees.
The proportion of self-employed is smallest in the developing economies of Europe
and Central Asia. Our most comprehensive estimate is that approximately 95 percent
of workers in the developing economies of Europe and Central Asia are wage and salar-
ied employees. This is higher than the 68 percent of Latin American and the Caribbean
workers who are employees and even higher than the proportion of workers who are
employees in high income European countries.
Across all regions and income levels, non-professional own-account workers and in-
formal employees face an earnings penalty compared to formal employees. This penalty
is statistically significant in all regions except for the developing economies of Europe
and Central Asia, where the penalty is small and often not statistically significant. In
addition, both the non-professional own-account and informal earnings penalties are
small (and often not statistically significant) in low income countries, The penalties to
being non-professional self-employed or informal increase as a country’s GDP in-
creases. The earnings penalties for informal employees are largest in middle income
countries, and the earnings penalties for non-professional own-account workers are lar-
gest in high income countries.
Across all countries, on average, we find that employers and own-account profes-
sionals enjoy an earnings premium compared to employees, with major differences be-
tween men and women. While earnings premiums for employers and professionals are
largest for men in middle income and Latin American countries, their female counter-
parts consistently earn a penalty in all countries (or an insignificant premium). Further,
we find that neither male nor female employers and professionals earn premiums in
Europe and Central Asia. This we believe might be due to fundamental differences in
labor market and other regulations and laws, which can directly affect earnings pre-
miums/penalties, between Latin America where employers and professionals are fa-
vored and Europe and Central Asia where employers and professionals are penalized.
Gender differences are particularly striking for employers and professionals. Statisti-
cally significant measured earnings premiums for male employers and professionals are
consistent with the hypothesis that men in these categories have a comparative advan-
tage in self-employment, or are being compensated for the higher costs and risks of
self-employment compared to wage and salaried employees. The sizeable average pen-
alties for female employers and professionals suggests that men and women make dif-
ferent calculations when deciding to become and remain employers or professional
workers. One possibility is that because women are primarily responsible for unpaid
domestic work, women are more willing to accept lower earnings as employers and
professional own-account workers as compensation for flexibility in hours and location
of work.
In general, the findings are not consistent with high rates of labor market segmenta-
tion in low income countries as an explanation for the high levels of self-employment.
In these countries, we find small earnings penalties for own-account non-professional
workers relative to formal employees, and in a larger sample of countries own-account
Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 37 of 39non-professional workers earn an earnings premium relative to all wage employees. As
countries develop, these premiums decline and become substantial penalties in high in-
come countries. This evidence runs counter to the standard labor market segmentation
view, in which self-employment is prevalent in the poorest economies because most
workers are excluded from the formal economy, and the formal economy is incapable
of providing sufficient high-wage jobs for everyone who wants them. According to this
standard view, the proportion of workers who are self-employed falls as countries de-
velop and the wage differential between the self-employed and employees should even-
tually disappear.
Instead, evidence of moderate amounts of segmentation appears to be stronger in
middle and high income countries than low income countries. In particular, as GDP
per capita of a country increases, the earnings of formal employees increase relative to
employers and professionals, non-professional own-account workers and informal em-
ployees. We highlight two other hypotheses that are consistent with the trend that
earnings of formal employees increase relative to that of self-employed and informal
employees as GDP per capita increases. One is a dualistic economy model where for-
mal sector firms in low income countries have low productivity because a lack of credit,
lack of reliable inputs, lack of export markets and lack of demand do not allow them to
take advantage of economies of scale. For these reasons, formal sector firms in low in-
come countries will be less productive and employee wages will be low. As countries
develop, demand increases, and credit and export markets develop, thus the productiv-
ity of formal sector firms increases. The increase in productivity allows firms to share
rents with workers, driving up the earnings of formal employees relative to informal
employees and self-employed workers.
The second hypothesis is that self-employed workers may be willing to accept lower
earnings as compensation for increased flexibility in terms of hours and location of
work. This is likely to especially be true for women who are responsible for the major-
ity of unpaid domestic work such as childcare or elder care. Self-employment may be
valued because it provides the flexibility that allows for both domestic work and paid
employment, whereas wage and salaried employment with inflexible working hours
does not. The compensating differential explanation suggests that the self-employment
earnings penalty will be particularly large in more developed countries, where the oppor-
tunity cost of time is higher and therefore the flexibility of self-employment will be valued
more. Evidence supporting this last hypothesis is that penalties for self-employment are
larger for women than for men, and that the additional penalty that women pay for self-
employment, compared to men increases as GDP per capita increases.
Endnotes
1The costs of searching for wage employment include information costs. A lack of in-
formation may help to create a self-employment wage penalty. For example, self-
employed farmers in rural areas in developing countries may not be aware that they
could earn more in urban areas (Brya et al. 2012; Jensen 2012).
2See, among others, Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers (1988).
3The database is an updated version of that described in Montenegro and Hirn
(2009). Version 4 of the I2D2, which was released in October 2013, was used for this
study.
Gindling et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2016) 5:20 Page 38 of 394Self-employed workers include those who self-identify as either an own-account
worker or an owner/employer. We use the ILO definition of own-account workers as
“workers who, working on their own-account or with one or more partners, hold the
type of job defined as a self- employed job, and have not engaged on a continuous basis
any employees to work for them during the reference period” (http://laborsta.ilo.org/
applv8/data/icsee.html).
5The frequency of wage payments is included as a control in order to guard against
errors in the coding of wage payment frequencies across surveys, which could other-
wise severely distort the results.
6These results are consistent with the findings of our earlier work in Gindling and
Newhouse (2014).
7It should be noted that our MENA sample is limited to only Yemen and Djibouti
while our South Asia sample is represented by Bangladesh and Pakistan which might
not be representative of the entire regions.
8Results for non-agricultural workers only are similar to those presented for urban
workers only.
9Because professional own-account workers are almost surely university graduates, it
does not make sense to report earnings differentials by education level separately for
employers and professionals and non-professional own-account workers.
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